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Abstract
In this paper, we highlight the link between the political demand
and social policy outcome while taking into account the design of the
party system. The political demand is measured by individual pref-
erences and the design of the party system is defined as the extent of
party fractionalization. This is, to our knowledge, the first attempt in
the literature to empirically link the political demand and the policy
outcome with the help of a direct measure of preferences. Moreover,
we account for an additional channel, so far neglected in the literature:
The composition effect of the demand. Indeed, the heterogeneity of
the demand within countries, more than the level of the demand itself,
is shown to have a positive impact on welfare state generosity. This
impact increases with the degree of fractionalization of the party sys-
tem. We run regressions on a sample of 18 OECD countries over 23
years, carefully dealing with the issues raised by the use of time-series
cross-section data.
Keywords: Political Demand, Party Fractionalization, Redistribu-
tion, Time-Series-Cross-Section Data
JEL Code: D78, H10, H53, C33
∗Universite´ Paris I Panthe´on-Sorbonne, CES-MATISSE and CEPREMAP
†Universite´ Paris Nord, PSE and IZA
‡PSE (Paris School of Economics) guillaud@pse.ens.fr
1
Contents
1 Introduction 5
2 Conceptual Framework 6
2.1 Related Literature . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
2.2 Our Argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
3 Data 12
4 Estimation Strategy and Basic Results 15
4.1 Model Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
4.2 Interaction Term and Marginal Effect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4.3 Basic Results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
5 Criticisms and Further Results 18
5.1 Introducing Fixed Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5.1.1 Model Specification with Fixed Effects . . . . . . . . . 18
5.1.2 Heteroskedasticity and Spatial Correlation . . . . . . . 19
5.1.3 Results of Fixed Effects Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . 20
5.2 Coping with Time-invariant Variables and Fixed Effects . . . 21
5.2.1 Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition Procedure . . . . . 22
5.2.2 Results of FEVD Estimates . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
5.3 Dynamic Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3.1 Dynamic Model Specification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
5.3.2 Dynamics with Fixed Effects: the Nickell Bias . . . . . 25
5.3.3 Unit Roots . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
5.3.4 Results of Dynamic Regressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
6 What Have We Learned? 27
6.1 What Drives the Generosity of the Welfare State? . . . . . . . 28
6.2 How is the Heterogeneity of Preferences Conveyed by Party
Fractionalization? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
6.3 How Large is the Effect? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30
7 Conclusion 30
2
A Demand for Redistribution 38
A.1 Basic Model of Welfare State Generosity . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
A.2 Fixed Effects Model of Welfare State Generosity . . . . . . . . 40
B Dispersion of Preferences for Redistribution 42
B.1 Basic Model of Welfare State Generosity . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
B.2 Fixed Effects Model of Welfare State Generosity . . . . . . . . 44
C Descriptive Statistics 46
List of Tables
1 Welfare state generosity (OLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
2 Marginal effect of the demand for redistribution (OLS) . . . . 39
3 Marginal effect of party fractionalization (OLS) . . . . . . . . 39
4 Welfare state generosity (FE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
5 Marginal effect of the demand for redistribution (FE) . . . . . 41
6 Marginal effect of party fractionalization (FE) . . . . . . . . . 41
7 Welfare state generosity (OLS) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42
8 Marginal effect of the dispersion of preferences (OLS) . . . . . 43
9 Marginal effect of party fractionalization (OLS) . . . . . . . . 43
10 Welfare state generosity (FE) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 44
11 Marginal effect of the dispersion of preferences (FE) . . . . . . 45
12 Marginal effect of party fractionalization (FE) . . . . . . . . . 45
13 Summary statistics of the sample . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
14 ISSP surveys - sample size . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46
15 Unit Root Tests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
List of Figures
1 Welfare state generosity by country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47
2 Demand for redistribution by country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 48
3 Dispersion of preferences for redistribution by country . . . . . 48
4 Distribution of preferences for redistribution - 1985 . . . . . . 49
5 Distribution of preferences for redistribution - 1987 . . . . . . 49
6 Distribution of preferences for redistribution - 1990 . . . . . . 50
7 Distribution of preferences for redistribution - 1992 . . . . . . 50
3
8 Distribution of preferences for redistribution - 1996 . . . . . . 51
9 Distribution of preferences for redistribution - 1999 . . . . . . 51
10 Party fractionalization by country . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52
11 WS generosity and party fractionalization (corr 0.50) . . . . . 52
12 WS generosity and demand for redistribution (corr 0.34) . . . 53
13 WS generosity and dispersion of preferences (corr 0.14) . . . . 53
4
1 Introduction
The way agents’ conflicting policy demands are brought together and con-
veyed into the set of choices of government is a major determinant of public
policy outcome. In democracies, coalitions between social groups are gener-
ally formed inside the Parliament, which is a central body of national repre-
sentation where elected parties meet each other and bargain together. The
type of competition that governs political parties’ negotiation is thus deci-
sive, since it affects both their representativity and the number of parties
that will finally accede to power (Cox, 1990; Lijphart, 1994).
In this paper, we focus on the determinants of the welfare state. We
develop an empirical analysis of the link between the political demand for
redistribution and the redistributive policies actually implemented. Further-
more, we highlight the role played by the degree of fractionalization of the
political supply in the transmission of the demand. Our contribution to the
existing literature in comparative political economy is threefold.
First, we use a direct measure of preferences, thus avoiding the use of a
proxy for the demand. Indeed, most scholars in empirical political economy
use income to proxy preferences for redistribution, as suggested by the work
of Meltzer and Richard (1981).
Second, we take into account the composition effect of the demand,
through a measure of the dispersion of preferences. We thus render apparent
the link existing between the degree of heterogeneity of voter preferences at
the micro level and the policy outcome at the macro level. By doing this, we
take most advantage of our individual data on preferences.
Third, considering interactions, we do not only look at the demand, but
also consider the political supply. Indeed, our setting allows the impact
of the demand to be conditioned by the structure of the political supply.
The structure of the political supply is here characterized by the degree of
fractionalization of the party system.
Our empirical analysis uses micro- and macroeconomic data that cover
18 OECD countries and span over 23 years (1980-2002). We study the de-
terminants of the welfare state, as measured by a global indicator of gen-
erosity elaborated by Scruggs (2004). The political demand is derived from
microeconomic data, gathered in ISSP surveys along several years. More
specifically, we use information concerning the proportion of individuals who
agree with government redistribution, i.e. those who answered positively to
the following question: “It is the responsibility of the government to reduce
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the differences in income between those with high income and those with low
income”.
Taking further advantage of our micro data on preferences, we account
for an additional channel, so far neglected in the literature: The composition
effect of the demand. Doing this, we aim to highlight the importance of the
heterogeneity of the demand in determining the policy outcome. Using the
5-points answers to the question on redistributive policy (from 1 “Strongly
Agree” to 5 “Strongly Disagree”), we measure the dispersion to the mean
in the distribution of preferences each year, for each country. Finally, we
consider the degree of fractionalization of the party system, measured by the
fractionalization index of Rae (1967), taken from the database of Armingeon
et al. (2004).
Our results are the following. First, we show that a naive demand effect
is indeed at work: The level of preferences for redistribution do have an
impact on the generosity of the welfare state. Second, the heterogeneity of
the demand, more than the level of the demand itself, is shown to have a
strong positive impact on welfare state generosity. Finally, we show that the
impact of the demand is conditioned by the party structure. Indeed, the
positive impact of the demand (be it in level or in dispersion) is reinforced
by the degree of fractionalization of the party system. However, controlling
for country fixed effects, we do not find a strong evidence of a direct impact
of party fractionalization by itself on the generosity of governments.
All these results are robust to a large variety of econometric specifications.
Indeed, carefully dealing with the issues raised by the use of time-series
cross-section data, we start our analysis with a simple benchmark model and
add further complexity step by step, including fixed effects, slowly changing
variables and dynamics.
The paper is organised as follows. In Section 2, we review the related
literature and further detail our argument. In Section 3, we describe the data
used in the empirical analysis. Section 4 presents our estimation strategy and
the results of the basic regressions, while criticisms are addressed in Section
5. Section 6 summarizes the results and Section 7 concludes.
2 Conceptual Framework
In this section, we first review the literature related to the political deter-
minants of the welfare state and the role of political institutions. We then
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present our argument and the mechanisms we want to make apparent in the
regressions.
2.1 Related Literature
There is a long research tradition in political science that deals with the
influence of electoral rules on party structures (Cox, 1990 ; Lijphart, 1994
and 1999). The Duverger’s law predicts that the majority rule will lead
to a two-party system (Grofman, 2006). The outcome of the elections will
be a single-party government much more often that when elections are held
under the proportional rule. Indeed, the latter has a positive impact on
the fractionalization of political parties and leads to coalition governments
(Laver and Schofield, 1990).
Furthermore, some recent empirical research in political economics aims
at studying the effect of electoral rules on social policy. Results show that
majoritarian rule induces lower government spending, smaller budget deficits
and more generally less protective welfare states than proportional rule (Iversen,
2005). However, the mechanism that is behind this result is not clear cut.
On one hand, Milesi-Feretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) who study the size
of goverment and Persson and Tabellini (1999) who consider the composition
of government spending, all claim that the electoral rule has an effect on the
public expenditure through the incentives of politicians to target marginal
districts. According to the electoral rule, the distribution of preferences
across social groups and across geographical districts will induce different
equilibrium public policy. On the other hand, recent articles by Bawn and
Rosenbluth (2006) and Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007) points out that
the electoral rule affects the level of public expenditures through the party
structure and the type of government. They conclude that compared to
single-party governments, coalition governments lead to higher government
expenditures. Our analysis partly uses this latter approach, since we aim to
show how party structure can impact policy outcome. To explain this result,
several arguments are evoked.
An electoral accountability argument is proposed by Bawn and Rosen-
bluth (2006): Single-party governments, even if they represent heterogeneous
social groups, are supposed to internalise more efficiently the cost of their
policy, as compared to several small parties that vie together within coali-
tion governments and represent each a single social group. This argument
is close to the common-pool problem that arises in centralised decision mak-
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ing, when the costs of a policy are shared while the benefits are concentrated
(Weingast, Shepsle and Johnsen, 1981).
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2007) highlight the fact that economic
policy formation is built on electoral conflicts between the government and
the opposition, but also between parties within coalition governments. Given
that the electorate can discriminate between different parties in a coalition
government, the authors conclude (and empirically test) that social spend-
ing is higher under coalition governments, due to increased intra-government
electoral competition. Finally, they claim that the mechanism that yields
to inflate public expenditures under the proportional electoral regime has no
direct link with the electoral rule, but instead owes to the fractionalization of
political parties: “PR induces higher spending than majoritarian elections,
but only through more party fragmentation and higher incidence of coalition
government. In other words, if we hold the type of government constant,
the electoral rule has no direct effect on public spending.” (p.158) In the
following, we analyze the direct impact of party fractionalization on the gen-
erosity of the welfare state. But going beyond the existing literature, we also
introduce an interaction effect of party fractionalization with the political
demand of voters.
Indeed, in democracies by definition political demand has a central role
in policy formation. Hence, a proper analysis of economic policy should take
into account the role played by the demand. This demand does, however,
interact with the structure of the political supply. In fact, the way hetero-
geneous demands, when it comes to redistribution or social protection, are
conveyed into the policy arena determines the size of public spending or the
generosity of the welfare state. This depends on the structure of the political
supply, in terms of party system and electoral rules. Consequently, it is the
interaction between the conflictual demands and the way to satisfy them in
accordance with the proper objectives of the political parties that determines
the final policy equilibrium.
In this perspective, Amable and Gatti (2007) propose a model of deter-
mination of the level of employment protection legislation and of the level of
redistribution. The model, that builds on Pagano and Volpin (2001, 2005),
studies the political equilibria of an economy where three groups of agents
live together: employed workers, unemployed and entrepreneurs. As a stan-
dard simplification, the model assumes that each party represents a distinct
social group. None of the party can win a majority by itself. As a con-
sequence, representative parties of each group form coalitions. The model
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shows that the redistributive effort of governments is positively correlated to
the bargaining power of the “employed workers” group. In the present work,
we are very close to this conception of the political game that explicitely
takes into account the heterogeneity of voter preferences and sees the issue
of the conflict as a bargaining game.
The notion of bargaining power can be interpreted with the help of com-
parative political economy, namely the contributions of Korpi and Palme
(2003) and Crepaz (1998). These authors underline that the bargaining
power of social groups depends on their capacity to access State decision-
making bodies. This access is notably eased by the representation in elected
organs (like the Parliament). Crepaz (1998) in particular highlights that an
increase in the number of “veto points” within the political system raises
the representativity of elected bodies and the number of parties present in
Parliament. This allows to enlarge the sphere of influence of lower and mid-
dle classes. The bargaining power of those is therefore directly linked to the
nature of the political supply. This implies that the link between the politi-
cal demand and the social policy outcome is shaped by the structure of the
political system. In the following, we empirically test this argument of an
interaction between the political demand and the structure of the political
supply.
2.2 Our Argument
Let us now briefly define the conceptual framework underlying our work and
the main mechanisms we infer to evaluate the determinants of the welfare
state.
First and as a start1, we use the typical assumptions of the literature and
suppose that (i) the political demand is rooted in the individual preferences of
voters for economic policies2 (rational voters); preferences are single-peaked;
there is only a single dimension upon which voters rely their vote, which is
in our case the redistributive policy. Under such conditions, the problem
of how to aggregate heterogeneous individual preferences issued by Arrow
(1951) find a solution in the Median Voter Theorem (Black, 1948; Downs,
1957). Hence, we simply count the number of individuals who have the same
attitudes and do not take into account the composition of the demand.
1Some of the hypotheses below will be relaxed later on the study.
2In an empirical viewpoint, we suppose that people do express their preferences in a
sincere manner when asked to do so.
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Second, turning to the political supply, we suppose that (ii) it is organized
in parties, who intend to win elections (Downs, 1957); parties know the
distribution of preferences of voters. If follows that the strategy of parties
to win elections is to go to the political space where the maximum demand
stands.
Third, we suppose that (iii) there are binding elections, in the sense that
parties first propose a policy platform (at the election stage) and then have
a commitment to implement it once elected (at the policy formation stage)3.
At the equilibrium, the policy outcome is the policy proposed by the party
(or coalition of parties) who wins the elections and forms a government.
Political demand: The consequence of (i) and (ii) is that the more nu-
merous people who agree with redistribution (the higher the preferences for
redistribution in the population), the more parties do propose redistribu-
tion. The consequence of (iii) is that the higher the redistribution proposed
by parties during the election stage, the bigger the welfare state implemented
by the government. We thus conclude that the more numerous people who
agree with redistribution, the bigger the welfare state.
Since it has been shown that there is an issue in aggregating individual
preferences when they are heterogeneous (Arrow, 1951), we also look at the
composition of the demand, in order to stay as close as possible to individual
preferences. The distribution of preferences ranges from a strong positive
feeling towards the policy at play to a strong negative attitude.
Theoretically, it is well known that redistribution is higher, the bigger
the gap between the mean and the median income (Meltzer and Richard,
1981), the income being used as a proxy of preferences for redistribution.
However, dispersion is a broader concept that may go beyond the mean to
median gap and capture the intensity of the demand. One may think that
the political outcome can change as preferences become more extreme, even
for a given mean and median (and even if the mean equals the median).
For instance, one could think that a more polarized demand induces parties
to focus on the part of the electorate which is relatively more concentrated.
Indeed, parties have no interest in trying to catch the electorate at the op-
posite location of the policy space. Such an effect would even be reinforced
3This binding effect can come from the fact that once elected, parties immediately
think of their re-election.
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if one considered partisan preferences of voters and the presence of swing
voters. We test this possibility of an impact of preferences dispersion on the
policy outcome by measuring the coefficient of variation of preferences for
redistribution (standard deviation relative to the mean).
Dispersion of preferences: As the distribution of preferences for redis-
tribution is systematically skewed to the right in our sample (the mean is
higher than the median), a higer dispersion relative to the mean increases
the relative concentration of individuals who agree with redistribution. Hence,
the effect of more demand dispersion has the same expected sign as the one
induced by an increase in the demand. We argue that the demand effect
is more prominent when the distribution of preferences in the population is
dispersed, keeping the mean unchanged.
In parliamentary democracies, when parties are highly fractionalized,
they have to form coalitions in order to gather the sufficient number of votes
to govern. Hence, the more numerous political parties, the higher the oc-
currence of government coalitions. Following the literature on legislative
bargaining, when it comes to policy formation we suppose that government
coalitions do not behave the same as single-party governments (Baron and
Ferejohn, 1989). This can come from several mechanisms: (iv) Single-party
governments do internalize the cost of their policy, while coalition govern-
ments only see the interest of the social group who supports them. (v) Vot-
ers can still discriminate between different parties in a coalition government,
whereas they cannot discriminate between different factions in a single-party
government.
From (iv), it follows that coalition governments under-estimate the to-
tal cost of their policy, which is borne by the entire population (Bawn and
Rosenbluth, 2006). This should especially be true for redistributive poli-
cies (common-pool problem). From (v), it follows an increased competition
within coalition governments (Persson, Roland and Tabellini, 2007). Each
party within the coalition has then an incentive to raise its effort to satisfy its
electorate4. Consequently, the degree of fractionalization of political parties
has a positive impact on the level of public expenditures.
Moreover, according to Crepaz (1998), a higher number of parties raises
the representativity of elected bodies in multiparty legislatures, by raising the
4This mechanism actually reinforces the common-pool problem.
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number of collective veto points5. It follows that a higher fractionalization
of the party system should better reflect the political demand of lower and
middle classes, hence the generosity of the welfare state.
Design of the party system: We expect the impact of the political de-
mand to be conditioned by the party structure: The higher the party frac-
tionalization, the stronger the impact of the demand on policy outcome.
Furthermore, an increased competition implies different strategies according
to the distribution of voter preferences, namely its dispersion. We therefore
expect the dispersion of the demand to be conveyed into policy outcome.
3 Data
The study uses time-series cross-section data for 18 OECD countries6 over
the period 1980-2002 (Table 13). Data come from different sources, some
microeconomic ones when we deal with the demand for redistribution (ISSP
surveys over several years7) and other macroeconomic ones when it comes
to the size of government (Scruggs, 2004). Political variables come from the
widely-used databases of Armingeon et al. (2004) and Cusack and Engel-
hardt (2002).
In order to measure the economic policy that deals with income protec-
tion, we use a global index of generosity of the welfare state (Figure 1) cal-
culated by Scruggs (2004)8. This index is a computation of net replacement
rates of unemployment benefits, sickness benefits and pension insurance, the
extent of program coverage and duration -it is actually an extension of the
decommodification index of Esping-Andersen (1990). The advantage of this
index is that it gives a better idea of the willingness of the States to protect
income than the ratio of social expenditures to GDP, since it encompasses
not only generosity scores, but also measures of access conditions.
5A similar argument is developed by Lijphart (1994) when describing parliamentary
systems as consensus democracies.
6Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland,
Italy, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom and USA.
7We use data from the following ISSP modules “Social Inequality I, II and III” and
“Role of Government I, II and III” that took place in years 1985, 1987, 1990, 1992, 1996
and 1999 (data available at www.gesis.org).
8Scruggs’ Overall Generosity Score is available on his website. See also Allan and
Scruggs (2004).
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The political demand is here defined as being the share of people who
agree with government redistribution (Figure 2). More precisely, it is the
share of individuals, by year and by country, who agree or strongly agree
while answering to the following ISSP survey question (Table 14):
“What is your opinion of the following statement: It is the re-
sponsibility of the government to reduce the differences in income
between people with high incomes and those with low incomes”
Possible answers rank from 1 (strongly agree) to 5 (strongly disagree).
The higher the measure of the demand, the higher the number of people who
agree with redistribution9.
The heterogeneity of the political demand is defined as being the coeffi-
cient of variation of preferences for redistribution (Figure 3): It is a measure
of dispersion of the within-country distribution of answers, based on the dis-
agregated data of micro surveys (Figures 4 to 9). We first calculate the
standard deviation, for each survey year and each country, of answers to
the question on redistribution; we then divide the standard deviation by the
country mean answer, in order to have a scale-free measure of dispersion10:
CV =
σpi,t
µpi,t
with σ the standard deviation of the distribution of preferences pi,t and µ
the mean preferences, by country i and year t. We are thus able to compare
the dispersion of answers in countries with very different mean preferences11.
9In order to have a demand variable that is continuous, and given that mean preferences
by country are slowly changing over time, we interpolate the missing points between two
surveys and suppose that the demand is invariant over the beginning period 1980-1985.
Several robustness check have been done (using the mean answer of individuals with and
without weights, using the median answer, dropping some time span), which do not affect
the results.
10We could also take advantage of a measure of the asymmetry of the distribution of
preferences by country, either proxied by the difference between the mean and the median
divided by the standard deviation of the distribution (Pearson’s skewness), or calculated
with respect to the third moment about the mean (Fisher’s skewness). However, since the
distribution of preferences is systematically skewed to the right in our sample (mean >
median), results are similar to those obtained using the mean level of preferences.
11As a robustness check, we also computed the index of ordinal variation (I.O.V.) instead
of the standard deviation of demand for redistribution. The I.O.V. is 0 when all values
13
The higher the CV, the more heterogeneous within-country preferences for
redistribution.
Finally, the fractionalization of the party system is taken from Armingeon
et al. (2004) and measured according to the formula of Rae (1967):
F = 1−
m∑
i=1
t
2
i
with ti the share of votes for party i and m the number of parties (Figure
10). The higher the Rae’s index, the more fractionalized the party system
(the higher the number of parties).
As for controls, we include in our regressions the government’s ideological
position in the left-right spectrum (continuous variable) weighted by votes,
calculated by Amable, Gatti and Schumacher (2006) using information from
Cusack and Engelhardt (2002) database. This database builds itself on the
Comparative Manifesto Project (Budge et al., 2001). The standardized un-
employment rate (OECD) is used as an additional macroeconomic control,
along with a measure of productivity (GDP per employed worker based on US
dollars 2002, OECD). Productivity enters the regression in natural logarithm
and with a 1 period lag, in order to limit collinearity with the unemployment
rate12.
Our time-series cross-section data set contains 18 OECD countries over
23 years. However, only 15 countries participated to the ISSP modules we
are interested in to construct our demand variable. Indeed, Belgium and
Finland did not participate, and data for Denmark are available only for the
last wave (year 1999), on a non standardized separate data set. We did not
include it in the analysis. Nor did we include Netherlands and Portugal,
since the ISSP data were available only for the year 1999, implying a time-
invariant demand for redistribution over the entire period13. Finally, when
fall into one category, and 1 when extreme polarization is present. In our sample, it
varies from 0.47 to 0.79. The correlation between the index of ordinal variation and
the standard deviation of our demand variable is 98%. This conforts our assumption of
continuous preferences. Hence, considering that the standard deviation is a more popular
concept, and since results are not affected at all by the choice of the measure of dispersion,
we only report regressions using the coefficient of variation based on standard deviation.
12We also checked for the inclusion of a measure of inflation and budget deficit, but
these never turned out to be significant, so we do not include them in the final regressions.
13As a robustness check, we included Netherlands in the sample. Results are left un-
changed.
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dealing with the generosity score of the welfare state constructed by Scruggs
(2004), data for Portugal and Spain are not available. We eventually run the
regressions for 12 countries over the time span 1980-2002 (Table 13).
4 Estimation Strategy and Basic Results
As a baseline model, we first estimate a naive pooled OLS model, which
does not take into account the panel structure of our data. OLS assumes
spherical errors (homoskedasticity and independence of the errors), a strong
assumption which, if not hold, keeps OLS estimates unbiased but renders
them inefficient. Hence, we systematically compute panel corrected standard
errors (PCSE) that takes into account panel-level heteroskedasticity and
contemporaneous spatial correlation, following Beck and Katz (1995)14.
4.1 Model Specification
Our baseline model is the following:
yit = α+ β1fit + β2pit + β12fitpit + it (1)
where it is the i.i.d. error term
yit being the overall generosity score of the welfare state, which is de-
fined by country i and by year t, fit being the level of party fractionalization
measured by the Rae formula, pit being either the level or the coefficient of
variation of preferences for redistribution, and fitpit being the interaction be-
tween party fractionalization and preferences (level or dispersion). In other
words, we test a reduced form of a relationship with a complementarity ef-
fect. Since we run an OLS estimate, α is a single intercept that reflects the
expected value of the dependent variable when all of the independent vari-
ables are zero.
14Importantly, the authors show the superiority of PCSE estimates over GLS estimates
when T is not significantly higher than N. Indeed, when T does not tend to infinity, as is
the case in our dataset, the Park method (GLS estimate) yields standard errors that are
too small -up to 600 percent- and therefore overconfident results. By contrast, so long as
T > 15 (which is our case, since T = 23), Monte Carlo experiments show that PCSEs are
considerably better than OLS standard errors when there is panel heteroskedasticity and
contemporaneous correlation of the errors.
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In a second specification of our model, we add some of the controls usually
found in the literature:
yit = α+ β1fit + β2pit + β12fitpit + γ1uit + γ2wit−1 + γ3git + δt + it (2)
uit being the unemployment rate, wit−1 being the log of labor productivity
lagged once (in order to limit collinearity with the unemployment rate) and git
being a measure of the partisanship of the government (continuous left-right
index)15. Moreover, while adding time dummies δt, we control for additional
(macroeconomic) shocks that are common to all countries16.
4.2 Interaction Term and Marginal Effect
Since we consider an interaction term between fractionalization and prefer-
ences (fitpit) in equations (1) and (2), the assessment concerning the expected
overall effect of pit needs the computation of its marginal effect conditional
on specific values of fit:
∂E(yit/x)
∂pit
= β̂2 + β̂12fit (3)
given that x is the vector of explanatory variables.
Hence, it is worth to notice that a positive and significant β2 in equations
(1) and (2) means nothing but that preferences for redistribution increase the
generosity of the State, only for those countries where the degree of party
fractionalization is zero (fit = 0) (Mullahy, 1999; Braumeoller, 2004). That
is for the unrealistic case of a single-party legislature17. Similarly, in order
to assess the significance of the effect of pit on yit conditional on fit values,
15It is worth to notice that we do not include a measure of age dependency (e.g. share
of the population below 15 or over 65), since this would be strongly correlated with our
demand variable, which is precisely the reason why it is usually included in the literature
given that scholars try to proxy the demand (Tabellini, 2000).
16We also checked for the existence of non linear relationships between variables, as it
would make sense according to our descriptive statistics (Figures 11, 12 and 13). To do this,
we applied a logarithmic transformation to our dependent and continuous independent
variables in equation (1). Results are globally the same as those obtained with a linear
approximation, so we do not report them here.
17This case, actually, could be achieved through a dictatorship, but since we only include
democratic countries in our dataset zero party fractionalization never occurs.
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the standard error of the sum (β2+ β12fit) will be computed in the following
way:
se =
√
var(β̂2) + f 2itvar(β̂12) + 2fitcov(β̂2β̂12) (4)
Keeping in mind that the coefficient and standard errors that appear in the
output of the regressions are partial ones -and not general ones like in an addi-
tive model-, it is not surprising that statistically insignificant (and negative)
coefficients might combine to produce statistically significant (and positive)
overall effects (Friedrich, 1982). Hence in the following, we systematically
report marginal effects of preferences for redistribution at different sample
values of party fractionalization (minimum, mean minus one standard devia-
tion, mean, mean plus one standard deviation, maximum). We also compute
the marginal effects of party fractionalization at different sample values of
preferences.
4.3 Basic Results
Tables 1 to 3 show the result of the baseline regressions, using the level of
the demand for redistribution as our independent variable of interest. In
this naive OLS estimates, we add variables step by step (Table 1): first, we
test a linear model without the complementarity effect (column [1]), then we
add the interaction term (column [2]), macroeconomic and political controls
(column [3]) and finally time dummies (column [4]).
We are especially interested in the marginal effect of the demand for
redistribution on the welfare state generosity (Table 2). When significant,
this marginal effect is always positive (column [1] Table 1, columns [2], [3]
and [4] Table 2) and increases with the level of party fractionalization when
controls are included (columns [3] and [4] Table 2). As for the overall impact
of party fractionalization, we also notice a positive impact on welfare state
generosity (column [1] Table 1, columns [2], [3] and [4] Table 3): The more
fractionalized the party system, the higher the welfare state generosity. This
effect is enhanced by the level of the demand, as soon as standard controls
are included in the regression (columns [3] and [4] Table 3).
We conclude from this first set of basic results that there is a positive
relationship between the level of the demand for redistribution and the gen-
erosity of governments, and between the degree of party fractionalization
and the generosity of governments. Importantly, demand for redistribution
and party fractionalization are complementary: An increase in the former
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enhances the positive impact of the latter on welfare state generosity, and
vice versa.
Turning to our second set of regressions, we aim to measure the impact of
the dispersion of preferences for redistribution on the welfare state generosity
(Tables 7 to 9). It comes out that -contrary to our expectations- the het-
erogeneity of the demand has a negative impact on welfare state generosity
(Table 8). Moreover, the higher the fractionalization of the party system,
the larger the negative impact of preferences dispersion. However, looking at
party fractionalization, the variable appears to maintain its strong positive
impact on welfare state generosity (Table 9). It is worth to notice here that
the above results are produced by pooled OLS, which do not take into ac-
count the particular structure of our cross-section time-series dataset, hence
lead to potentially biased estimates.
5 Criticisms and Further Results
There are a number of problems coming with the use of cross-section time-
series data. Below, we discuss some of them and the solutions we adopted to
deal with them. Specifically, we explain our choice of including fixed effects
into the model, hence consciously restricting our insight to intra-country
variation (Section 5.1). Then, we deal with the issue of correctly estimating
the impact of time-invariant variables while keeping fixed effects into the
model (Section 5.2). We further deal with dynamic issues and measure the
speed of adjustment of the welfare state (Section 5.3).
5.1 Introducing Fixed Effects
Country fixed effects control for characteristics that are specific to one coun-
try and do not vary across time. Such a specification takes advantage of the
time-series cross-section nature of our dataset.
5.1.1 Model Specification with Fixed Effects
The inclusion of fixed effects allows for unobserved heterogeneity. Instead of
a single intercept α, each cross-sectional unit is assigned its own intercept ηi.
Since our estimated fixed effects are always large and clearly significant, not
including them in the model would result in a presumably serious omitted
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variable bias (Green, Kim and Yoon, 2001). However, it is worth to notice
that while including fixed effects we limit our interest to the causes of intra-
country variation of welfare state generosity.
Hence, equations (1) and (2) become:
yit = β1fit + β2pit + β12fitpit + δt + ηi + µit (5)
yit = β1fit + β2pit + β12fitpit + γ1uit + γ2wit−1 + γ3git + δt + ηi + µit (6)
where ηi represents the country unit effect and µit is the i.i.d. error term.
5.1.2 Heteroskedasticity and Spatial Correlation
There are a number of statistical properties to verify while using the fixed
effects model.
First, cross-section correlation (spatial correlation) is a problem for fixed
effect estimation. Then, after running a standard fixed effect model, we look
at the Breusch-Pagan statistic that tests for cross-section independence in
the residuals18. Indeed, a fixed effect model assumes the independence of the
errors. A likely deviation from independent errors in the context of pooled
cross-section time-series data is the presence of contemporaneous correlations
across cross-sectional units (here across countries). The null hypothesis of
the Breusch-Pagan test is that of cross-sectional independence19. The test
rejects the null hypothesis20, hence there is spatial correlation in our data.
Second, a fixed effect model assumes homoskedasticity. The most likely
deviation from homoskedastic errors in the context of pooled cross-section
time-series data like ours is the presence of error variances specific to the
cross-sectional unit. Therefore, we calculate a modified Wald statistic for
18We use the xttest2 Stata command, following Greene (2000).
19In the context of a slightly unbalanced panel like ours, the observations used to cal-
culate the test statistic are those available for all cross-sectional units. Here, the number
of available observations reported is 16.
20Breusch-Pagan LM test of independence: χ2(66) = 158.526, p < 0.01 for the model
with the level of demand, and χ2(66) = 145.016, p < 0.01 for the model with the dispersion
of preferences.
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groupwise heteroskedasticity in the residuals of a fixed effect regression model21.
The null hypothesis of homoskedasticity is strongly rejected22.
Thus, the above tests suggest that we might not use the standard fixed
effect procedure without taking into account spatial correlation and panel
heteroskedasticity. As a consequence, we run least squares dummy variables
(LSDV) regressions (i.e. the unobserved effect is brought explicitly into the
model) that allow us to compute panel corrected standard errors (PCSE).
5.1.3 Results of Fixed Effects Regressions
Results concerning the impact of the demand for redistribution in level on the
welfare state generosity are shown in Tables 4 to 6, columns [5], [6] and [7].
As a start, we notice that the R-squared are highly raised by the inclusion
of fixed effects: Our fixed effects model is able to explain more than 95% of
the sample variation. Moreover, fixed effects are strongly significant23, which
means that not including them into the regression leads to an important
omitted variable bias (Green, Kim and Yoon, 2001).
Although it is not possible to theoretically assess the direction of the bias,
we clearly see the empirical difference between the coefficients of Table 1 and
those of Table 4 (the comparison is especially meaningful between columns
[4] Table 1 and [7] Table 4 that include the full set of controls). The same
comments apply to our regressions measuring the impact of the dispersion of
preferences on the welfare state generosity (Tables 10 to 12, columns [14] to
[16]).
Looking at control variables first, the impact of unemployment on welfare
state generosity remains negative and highly significant, but is half-size. The
coefficient of productivity becomes negative and significant, and increases in
size. Surprisingly, the coefficient of government partisanship turns positive
and is no more significant: This means that the position of the government
on the political (left-right) spectrum has no impact on the within-country
variation of welfare state generosity. Taking the result seriously, it means
that once we control for the preferences (of voters) for redistribution and
the degree of party fractionalization (hence, the occurence of coalitions),
21We use the xttest3 Stata command, following Greene (2000).
22Modified Wald test for groupwise heteroskedasticity: χ2(12) = 457.44, p < 0.01 for
the model with the level of demand, and χ2(12) = 1092.01, p < 0.01 for the model with
dispersion of preferences.
23Fixed effects coefficients are not shown here for space reason.
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government partisanship does not play any role in the size of government.
This runs counter to other studies on partisanship that show a strong impact
of the ideological position of governements on public expenditures (Huber,
Ragin and Stephens, 1993).
Looking at our key variables, two important results show up:
(i) The impact of the demand for redistribution, which is a slowly changing
variable, is entirely captured by country fixed effects: The coefficients
of columns [6] and [7] Table 5 cannot be distinguished from 0 -although
we still capture the complementarity effect between the demand and
party fractionalization24.
(ii) The impact of the dispersion of preferences for redistribution, which
is also a slowly changing variable, resists the introduction of country
fixed effects: The coefficients of columns [15] and [16] Table 11 are
positive and significant25. Moreover, once controls are included in the
regression, we capture the complementarity effect between dispersion
of preferences and party fractionalization.
(iii) The effect of party fractionalization on welfare state generosity is strongly
decreased by the inclusion of fixed effects (columns [6] and [7] Table
6 and columns [15] and [16] Table 12): Except when the demand for
redistribution (in level or in dispersion) is at its maximum value, we
merely find an impact of party fractionalization (the effect vanishes
when controls are included).
5.2 Coping with Time-invariant Variables and Fixed
Effects
Our measure of preferences (pit), be it in level or in dispersion, is considered
as a rarely changing variable. This means that the demand for redistribution
24Interestingly though, the impact of the demand for redistribution on welfare state
generosity is negative and significant when party fractionalization is at very low levels.
However, we have no explanation for this, except that running a fixed effects regression
with slowly changing variable leads to inefficient estimates (Beck and Katz, 1995; Plu¨mper
and Troeger, 2007).
25Importantly, here we measure the within-country impact of dispersion, whereas previ-
ous OLS regressions measured the pooled impact of dispersion on welfare state generosity.
However, the omitted variable bias appears to be strong in OLS regressions.
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is almost time-invariant or at least cross-sectionally dominated (Figure 2).
Indeed, as shown in the Appendix (Table 13), the between variance is more
than 3 times higher than the within variance. Hence, we are confronted to the
well-known problem of estimating a fixed effects model with (almost) time-
invariant variables. The problem comes from the fact that all the effect of the
time-invariant variables is likely to be captured by the unit fixed effects26.
To deal with this issue, we make use of the estimator proposed by Plu¨mper
and Troeger (2007): A three-stage panel fixed effects vector decomposition
model (FEVD procedure).
5.2.1 Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition Procedure
The FEVD process allows for the inclusion of time-invariant variables and ef-
ficiently estimates almost time-invariant explanatory variables within a panel
fixed effects framework (Plu¨mper and Troeger, 2007). More precisely:
(i) The first stage estimates a pure fixed effects model in order to obtain an
estimate of the unit effects (here our country effects ηi).
(ii) The second stage decomposes the fixed effects vector into a part ex-
plained by the time-invariant or almost time-invariant variables (here
our demand for redistribution pit) and an unexplainable part -the error
term of the second stage.
(iii) Finally, the third stage re-estimates the original model by pooled OLS,
including the error term of the second stage. This third step assures to
control for collinearity between time-varying and invariant right-hand
side variables, and adjusts the degrees of freedom.
To complement the estimation process, we apply panel corrected standard
errors (PCSE) to the third stage pooled OLS.
26Actually, the problem of almost time-invariant variables with fixed effects is slightly
different from the issue raised by time-invariant variables with fixed effects. As explained
by Plu¨mper and Troeger (p.16, 2007), “When the within variance is small, the FE model
does not only compute large standard errors, but in addition the sampling variance gets
large and therefore the reliability of point predictions is low and the probability that the
estimated coefficient deviates largely from the true coefficient increases.”
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5.2.2 Results of FEVD Estimates
Results for the level of the demand are shown in Tables 4 to 6, column [8].
We notice that the main impact of applying the FEVD procedure is to change
the coefficient of the almost time-invariant variable, while letting the other
coefficients unchanged27. The marginal effects of the demand for redistrib-
ution calculated in Table 5 for different values of party fractionalization are
positive and highly significant. They increase with the fractionalization of
the party system. Hence, the demand for redistribution is shown to have a
strong impact on welfare state generosity.
Results for the dispersion of preferences are shown in Tables 10 to 12,
column [17]. The marginal effects of the dispersion of preferences for redis-
tribution calculated in Table 11 for different values of party fractionalization
are positive and highly significant. They increase with the fractionalization
of the party system. We notice that the results obtained by FEVD estimates
(column [17]) are very close to the one obtained by FE estimates (column
[16]).
However, due to the fact that almost time-invariant variables are esti-
mated by quasi-pooled OLS in the second stage, their coefficients are possi-
bly biased, depending on their correlation with the unobserved unit effects
(Plu¨mper and Troeger, 2004). The bias is positive (negative) if the rarely
changing variables covary positively (negatively) with the unit fixed effects.
The importance of the bias depends on the size of the correlation and on
the size of the between-to-within ratio of the rarely changing variable: The
smaller the actual correlation and the larger this ratio, the smaller the actual
bias. Plu¨mper and Troeger (2007) run Monte-Carlo estimates to identify the
conditions under which the FEVD procedure is preferable to the FE esti-
mates. They show that if there is no correlation between the rarely changing
variable and the unit country effect, the between-to-within ratio can be as
small as 0.2; it the correlation is 0.3, the ratio should be larger than 1.7; at
a correlation of 0.5, the threshold increases to about 2.8.
Running the correlation matrix between our variables of interest and the
estimated unit effects (after the fixed effects model of the first stage), we
find correlations of 0.32 (demand for redistribution) and 0.04 (dispersion of
preferences). We know from Table 13 that the between-to-within ratio of our
27Indeed, the coefficients of the time-varying variables are still estimated by a standard
fixed effects model, as in column [7].
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slowly changing variables is 3.46 if we consider the demand for redistribution
(i.e. two times the recommanded threshold of 1.7), and as big as 2.90 if we
consider the dispersion of preferences for redistribution. Hence, our FEVD
estimates are undoubtedly consistent and we can be confident in our results.
5.3 Dynamic Issues
Following our descriptive statistics, we suspect some path dependency re-
garding the overall level of generosity of the welfare state (Figure 1). More-
over, the panel corrected standard errors that we calculate in our regressions
assume that the disturbances are heteroskedastic and contemporaneously
correlated across panels, but that there is no serial autocorrelation. There-
fore, for our estimates to be precise, we must take care of a potential serial
autocorrelation.
5.3.1 Dynamic Model Specification
We test for serial autocorrelation using the Wooldridge test for autocorre-
lation in panel data28. The test strongly rejects the null hypothesis of no
first-order autocorrelation29. Hence, we have two options: (i) Treating the
model as static and purging any temporal correlation or (ii) Explicitely using
the dynamics.
(i) If we treat the model as static and the temporal correlation as a problem,
we assume that the latter has no substantive interest. Then, the point
is to estimate ρ and to use it to correct the errors. This is the AR(1)
error model:
yit = β1fit + β2pit + β12fitpit + δt + ηi + µit (7)
where µit = ρµit−1 + νit,
or equivalently µit = ρyit−1 − Σβkρxkit−1 + νit
(ii) If we are interested in a dynamic specification of the model, we can
explicitly include the lagged dependent variable (LDV) into the model:
yit = ρyit−1 + β1fit + β2pit + β12fitpit + δt + ηi + µit (8)
28We use the xtserial Stata command, following Wooldridge (2002) and Drukker (2003).
29Wooldridge test for autocorrelation in panel data: F (1, 11) = 28.257, p < 0.01 for
the model with the level of demand, and F (1, 11) = 25.025, p < 0.01 for the model with
dispersion of preferences.
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With such a specification, we should get rid of the error autocorrelation,
since the lagged dependent variable includes lagged error term (Beck
and Katz, 2004). Contrary to the AR(1) specification that allows a
quick adjustment of the dependent variable, here we explicitely measure
long-term effects or slow adjustment of the dependent variable to a
change in the independent variables.
We have no a priori expectations on the speed of adjustment of our
dependent variable. However, the fixed effect vector decomposition estimator
can only take into account the AR(1) error process30. Not knowing the
resulting bias in the LDV specification, we therefore choose to run an AR(1)
model.
5.3.2 Dynamics with Fixed Effects: the Nickell Bias
The inclusion of a lagged dependent variable with fixed effects, be it implicit
or explicit, raises new issues. Indeed, it induces a correlation between yˆ,
the lagged dependent variable in terms of deviation from its mean (yˆit−1 =
yit−1 − 1T
∑
yit−1) and µˆ, the error term in terms of deviation from its mean
(µˆit−1 = µit−1 − 1T
∑
µit−1). Hence it leads to biased estimates (Nickell,
1981): There is a downward bias while estimating ρ, and an upward bias in
the estimations of β.
To deal with this issue, many alternative estimators have been proposed
in the econometric literature. However, all of them are specifically designed
for panel data (T < 10 and N very large), not for TSCS data (T > 20 and
N < 30)31.
Beck and Katz (2004) produce Monte Carlo experiments for TSCS alike
data. Adding a correlation between the unit effects and the exogenous vari-
ables, they aim to compare the performance of the LSDV estimator includ-
ing a lagged dependent variable, with the Anderson-Hsiao estimator and the
30Indeed, no correction is applied to the error of the second stage while running an LDV
model, though this second-stage error is to be used in the third stage OLS estimate. By
opposition, the FEVD procedure has been designed to apply the AR(1) Prais-Winsten
transformation in the first and third stages.
31For instance, the instrumental variables procedure suggested by Anderson and Hsiao
(1982) might be at the cost of raising dramatically the mean squared error (Beck and
Katz, 2004); GMM (Arellano and Bond, 1991) only works if N is very large; Kiviet (1995)
approach assumes the data are balanced, among other important issues that do not fit our
data.
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Kiviet correction, as both T and ρ vary (the other parameters are fixed at
a single value, with N = 20). Results are the following. The authors show
clear evidence that there is a downward bias using the LSDV estimator, which
dramatically decreases with T and slightly increases with ρ. Moreover, the
authors give strong advice not to use the Anderson-Hsiao estimator for TSCS
data, the cost of using it being very high in terms of root-mean square error
(namely, the estimation variability is very high). Finally, they advise to use
the LSDV estimator preferably to the Kiviet correction as long as T > 20,
which is our case (Table 13).
Consequently, when testing the dynamic specification of the model, we
stay with our FEVD estimator, which has the advantage of being able to
estimate the coefficient of the slowly-changing variable of interest, namely
the political demand. We apply the AR(1) error model defined in equation
(7) and assess the speed of adjustment of the generosity of the welfare state.
5.3.3 Unit Roots
Before to turn to the results, a last check should be done concerning the
presence of unit roots in the data (non-stationarity). Indeed, if our dependent
variable is not stationary, the introduction of a lagged dependent variable to
model dynamics will lead to spurious regressions. We thus run a battery of
unit roots tests.
Following Maddala and Wu (1999), we run a Fisher test, which assumes
that all series are non-stationary under the null hypothesis against the alter-
native that at least one series in the panel is stationary. Alternative tests are
those proposed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) (hereafter LL) and Im, Pesaran
and Shin (2003) (hereafter IPS). Under the null hypothesis that all series are
non-stationary, the test proposed by Levin, Lin and Chu (2002) supposes
that the autoregressive coefficient (ρ) is the same for all units. Hence, the
LL test is based on pooled regression and only fits balanced panel. Under
the same null hypothesis, the test proposed by Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003)
improves the LL test by relaxing the assumption of a common ρ: the IPS
test runs a separate unit test for each of the units and computes the mean
of the t-statistic of each independent Augmented Dickey-Fuller test. IPS fits
only balanced data with the same number of observations per unit. Finally,
we can see the Fisher test developed by Maddala and Wu (1999) as an im-
provement of the IPS test: it also runs individual tests but then combines
their significance with a Fisher test. Hence, it does not require a balanced
26
data. The Fisher test of Maddala and Wu (1999) and the IPS test of Im,
Pesaran and Shin (2003) are directly comparable. Since our data is only
slightly unbalanced, we compute both statistics32. Results are in Table 15.
Moreover, after estimating the dynamic version of the model, we system-
atically check whether the residuals appear stationary. To do that, we run an
autoregression of the residuals on their lags and check if the coefficient of the
lagged residuals is close to one. Finally, we also run a series of autoregression
for all our variables, thus examining the size of the coefficient of the lagged
variables (Beck, 2006). We conclude that there is no unit root in our panel.
5.3.4 Results of Dynamic Regressions
Tables 4 to 6 column [9] give the results of the estimates. We notice the
non trivial value of ρ (ρ = 0.82), which confirms the existence of a conver-
gence mechanism of the welfare state of each country towards its long term
value ( ηi
1−ρ) (Bond, 2002; Beck and Katz, 2004). In other words, the initial
deviation of the welfare state from its stationary value is very low (Blundell
and Bond, 1998). Indeed, the past level of the welfare state helps to explain
the current level: Radical reforms of the welfare state -like going, within a
country, from the level of the US to the level of Sweden- are not common.
However, the short term effect of the demand is still sizeable. Moreover,
we continue to capture the complementarity between the political demand
and the fractionalization of parties (Table 5): The higher the fractionalization
of the party system, the better the demand for redistribution is conveyed
to the policy implemented by the government. Importantly, the marginal
effects of the demand are very comparable to the ones obtained in the static
specifications of the model discussed above. Hence, this reinforces our results.
6 What Have We Learned?
Since we are interested in the joint effect of (the fragmentation of) the de-
mand with the fractionalization of the party system, we systematically in-
troduced an interaction term into our regressions. Conducting the analysis,
we seek to know to what extent the level of generosity of the welfare state
32We use the xtfisher Stata command to compute the Fisher test, and the ipshin Stata
command to compute the IPS test.
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depends on the level (or the dispersion) of the expressed demand for redistri-
bution and on the degree of atomicity of the political supply. We argue that
the impact of the demand should be positive and increase with the number
of parties.
6.1 What Drives the Generosity of the Welfare State?
In Tables 1 to 6 that test the argument according to which the level of the
demand for redistribution determines the generosity of the welfare state, we
find indeed that the marginal effect of the demand, always very significant, is
positive and increases with the degree of fractionalization of political parties
(Table 5). If taken in isolation, the impact of the fractionalization of the
supply on the generosity of the State is positive, but becomes significant
only when the demand for redistribution is above the mean (Table 6). These
results have two important implications:
(i) The political demand is indeed conveyed to the political arena, since it
has a direct impact on the level of generosity of the State, even when
the fractionalization of the political supply is weak (in other words,
democracy works well). In addition, the political demand and the
fractionalization of parties are complementary.
(ii) The fractionalization of political parties has a positive impact on the
welfare state only to the extent that it exists a relatively high de-
mand for redistribution. Hence, contrary to what has been found in
the literature (Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno, 2002; Bawn and
Rosenbluth, 2006), we do not find strong evidence of a direct impact
of the fractionalization of parties on the size of government33.
33Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2002) use data for 20 OECD countries over the
period 1960-1995. They look at the impact of a macro shock at different level of pro-
portionality of the political system on the spending/GDP ratio and on the transfer/GDP
ratio (OECD data). They conclude that the higher the proportionality of the system, the
higher the impact of a macro shock on the public spending. Bawn and Rosenbluth (2006)
use data for 17 Western European countries over the period 1970-1998. They look at the
impact of the number of parties in government (extracted from the database of Warwick,
1994) on the overall government expenditure as a fraction of GDP in a given year (OECD
data). They find a positive impact of the number of parties in government on the overall
government expenditure.
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6.2 How is the Heterogeneity of Preferences Conveyed
by Party Fractionalization?
We now turn to our second set of regressions, which assess the impact of the
dispersion of preferences. Here, we test the idea that the fragmentation of
the political demand, measured by its coefficient of variation, has a positive
impact on the generosity of the welfare state. This impact is assumed to
increase with the fractionalization of the party system. Tables 7 to 12 give
the results of regressions. The marginal effect of the dispersion of preferences
is indeed positive, increasing with Rae’s index (party fractionalization), and
highly significant (Table 11): The generosity of the government is higher
when the demand is spread out, and the fractionalization of parties helps to
convey the dispersion of this demand34. We add two important comments
on the results:
(i) Results are robust to the choice of the estimation process (fixed effect vec-
tor decomposition or OLS with country dummies and panel corrected
standard errors). Even if the unit fixed effect partly captures the im-
pact of the demand when running an OLS with country dummies, the
coefficient of preferences dispersion remains positive and significant.
(ii) The impact of the dispersion of preferences on the generosity of the wel-
fare state increases very rapidly with the degree of the fractionalization
of parties: It more than doubles in the dynamic specification, when the
fractionalization varies from its minimum value to its maximum value.
Hence, the parallelism between heterogeneity of preferences and abun-
dance of the political supply seems relevant.
Some comments on the control variables. First, we notice that the co-
efficient of the ideological position of governments never turns out to be
significant, once country fixed effects are included. This would suggest that
governments directly encompass the demand within their policy decision, and
have themselves no preferred policy. But we could also assume that the parti-
san position of governments, due to a feedback effect, is already captured by
the term which expresses individual preferences (Gerber and Jackson, 1993).
34We notice in addition that the size of the overall effect of party fractionalization is
very close to the one of the previous set of regressions.
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Concerning the macroeconomic controls, we notice that the unemployment
rate acts negatively on the index of generosity of the welfare state. We inter-
pret this as a downward adjustment of the replacement rates to an increase
in the number of beneficiaries (see Amable, Gatti and Schumacher, 2006 for
evidence on this point).
6.3 How Large is the Effect?
In order to interpret these results, it is important to get some sense of the
magnitude of the effect.
How Large is the Impact of the Demand? Other things being equal,
raising by 10% the number of people who agree with redistribution implies:
An increase of 3.2% of the welfare state generosity score, when the number
of political parties (Rae’s index) is at its minimum (2 parties); An increase
of 5.3% when the number of political parties reaches its maximum value (10
parties). Taking dynamics into account, these figures become 4% and 5%,
respectively. Hence, the political demand has a non trivial impact on public
policy outcome.
How Large is the Effect of the Dispersion of Preferences? Other
things being equal, raising by 10% the coefficient of variation of preferences
for redistribution implies: An increase of 3.7% of the welfare state generosity
score, when the number of political parties (Rae’s index) is at its minimum
(2 parties); An increase of 5.4% when the number of political parties reaches
its maximum value (10 parties). Taking dynamics into account, these figures
become 2.9% and 6.7%, respectively. We conclude that within-country het-
erogeneity of the demand is highly conveyed by party fractionalization.
Finally, an increased competition between parties benefits the electorate:
The demand of the electorate is better reflected in the policy formation when
parties are numerous.
7 Conclusion
This paper proposes an empirical analysis of the interaction between the
demand for redistribution expressed by individuals and the structure of the
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political supply. Hence, conflictual demands of heterogeneous agents can
find a way to be expressed in public policies, according to the design of
the political mediation. The latter partly depends on political institutions,
namely election rules and the structure of the political supply. This implies
that the matching of the supply to the political demand determines the nature
of the welfare state, specifically the level of redistribution. We thus expect
the structure of the party system to impact the generosity of the State,
while allowing or not heterogeneous demands for redistribution to be taken
into account. In particular, a more fractionalized party system will raise
the representativity of elected bodies and enhance the reflection of political
demand that comes from lower and middle class. Consequently, the higher
the fractionalization of the party system, the better reflected the demand for
redistribution into social policy outcomes. As far as we know, the empirical
literature on the subject only tests the influence of the supply on the nature of
public expenditures (Persson and Tabellini, 1999). No test of an interaction
between a feature of the political supply and the political demand has been
done.
The originality of the present work is then (i) to use a direct measure
of individual voter preferences, (ii) to analyze the composition effect of the
demand on policy outcome, and (iii) to take into account the interaction
between the demand for redistribution and the structure of the political sup-
ply. This is done to explain the level of generosity of the welfare state and
its variation within countries. Econometric regressions use time-series cross-
section data on a sample of 18 OECD countries spanned over the period
1980-2002. The data originates from both microeconomic databases (pref-
erences for redistribution) and macroeconomic databases (policy outcome,
party fractionalization).
Results clearly show that the demand for redistribution, measured in level
and in dispersion, leads to a more generous welfare state, the more the party
system is fractionalized (the higher the number of parties in Parliament).
This is robust to a large variety of econometric specifications.
Yet, as Shepsle and Weingast (p.50, 1984) put it: “Each of the above
conclusions depends upon a rather special sort of preference revelation. Indi-
vidual agents are assumed to be sincere revealers of their preferences so that
the majority preference relation (built up from sincerely revealed individual
preferences) may be taken as descriptive of the voting behaviour of majori-
ties”. This is a strong, though necessary, assumption that we have done in
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this study.
Importantly, concerning the aggregation of preferences, we made a sim-
plifying assumption by giving the same weight to each individual preference
(each person has one vote). This was necessary to generate conclusions at
the macro level. However, assuming an alternative microfoundations for our
model, we could extend our work. For instance, we could take into account
the partisan positions at the individual level. Indeed, less ideological voters
attract more attention from the parties, since they are considered as “swing
voters” (Lindbeck and Weibull, 1987). We could then find a way to count
the number of swing voters in a group35. An extension would thus be (i)
to gather preferences according to the social status or the occupation of in-
dividuals, thus trying to form socio-political groups and (ii) to deduce the
political weight of each group ex post, according to the dispersion of within-
group preferences.
Finally, as in most empirical works with time-series cross-section data
investigating the within country variation of variables, it would certainly be
interesting to open the black box of country fixed effect. A way to do it would
be to enter more information on the institutional features of countries within
the regression.
35Another way of infering different weights to people would be to identify lobbying
groups. Yet, this seems more difficult to do, according to our micro data.
32
References
[1] Allan, J. and L. Scruggs (2004) “Political Partisanship andWelfare State
Reform in Advanced Industrial Societies”, American Journal of Political
Science, 48(3): 493-512
[2] Amable, B. and D. Gatti (2007) “The Political Economy of Job Protec-
tion and Income Redistribution”, mimeo
[3] Amable, B., D. Gatti and J. Schumacher (2006) “Welfare-State Re-
trenchment: The Partisan Effect Revisited”, Oxford Review of Eco-
nomic Policy, 22(3): 426-444
[4] Anderson, T.W. and C. Hsiao (1982) “Formulation and Estimation of
Dynamic Models Using Panel Data”, Journal of Econometrics, 18(1):
47-82
[5] Arellano and Bond (1991) “Some Tests of Specification for Panel Data:
Monte Carlo Evidence and an Application to Employment Equations”,
Review of Economic Studies, 58(2): 277-297
[6] Armingeon, K., M. Gerber, P. Leimgruber, M. Beyeler and S. Menegale
(2004) “Comparative Political Data Set 1960-2002”, Institute of Political
Science, University of Berne
[7] Arrow, K.J. (1951) Social Choice and Individual Values, New York:
Wiley
[8] Baron, D.P. and J.A. Ferejohn (1989) “Bargaining in Legislatures”,
American Political Science Review, 83(4): 1181-1206
[9] Bawn, K. and F. Rosenbluth (2006) “Short versus Long Coalitions: Elec-
toral Accountability and the Size of the Public Sector”, American Jour-
nal of Political Science, 50(2): 251-265
[10] Beck (2006) “Time-Series-Cross-Section Methods”, draft, New York
University
[11] Beck, N. and J.N. Katz (1995) “What To Do (and Not To Do) with
Time-Series Cross-Section Data”, American Political Science Review,
89(3): 634-647
33
[12] Beck, N. and J.N. Katz (2004) “Time-Series-Cross-Section Issues: Dy-
namics, 2004”, draft, New York University and California Institute of
Technology
[13] Black, D. (1948) “On the Rationale of Group Decision-making”, Journal
of Political Economy, 56(1): 23-34
[14] Blundell, R. and S. Bond (1998) “Initial Conditions and Moment Re-
strictions in Dynamic Panel Data Models”, Journal of Econometrics,
87(1): 115-143
[15] Bond, S. (2002) “Dynamic Panel Data Models: A Guide to Micro Data
Methods and Practice”, Portuguese Economic Journal, 1(2): 141-162
[16] Braumoeller, B.F. (2004) “Hypothesis Testing and Multiplicative Inter-
action Terms”, International Organization, 58(4): 807-820
[17] Budge, I., H.-D. Klingemann, A. Volkens, J. Bara and E. Tanabaum
(2001) Mapping Policy Preferences: Estimates for Parties, Electors, and
Governments, 1945-1998, Oxford: Oxford University Press
[18] Cox, G. (1990) “Centripetal and Centrifugal Forces in Electoral Sys-
tems”, American Journal of Political Science, 34(4): 903-935
[19] Crepaz, M.M.L. (1998) “Inclusion versus Exclusion: Political Institu-
tions and Welfare Expenditures”, Comparative Politics, 31(1): 61-80
[20] Cusack, T.R. and L. Engelhardt (2002) “The PGL File Collection”,
WZB
[21] Downs, A. (1957) An Economic Theory of Democracy, New York:
Harper
[22] Drukker, D.M. (2003) “Testing for Serial Correlation in Linear Panel-
data Models”, Stata Journal, (3)2: 168-177
[23] Esping-Andersen, G. (1990) The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism,
Princeton: Princeton University Press
[24] Friedrich, R.J. (1982) “In Defense of Multiplicative Terms in Multiple
Regression Equations”, American Journal of Political Science, 26(4):
797-833
34
[25] Gerber, E.R. and J.E. Jackson (1993) “Endogenous Preferences and the
Study of Institutions”, American Political Science Review, 87(3): 639-
656
[26] Green, D., S.Y. Kim and D. Yoon (2001) “Dirty Pool”, International
Organization, 55(2): 441-468
[27] Greene, W. (2000) Econometric Analysis, Upper Saddle River, NJ:
Prentice-Hall
[28] Grofman, B. (2006) “The Impact of Electoral Laws on Political Parties”,
in Weingast, B. and D. Wittman (Eds) Handbook of Political Economy,
Oxford: Oxford University Press
[29] Huber, E., C. Ragin and J.D. Stephens (1993) “Social Democracy,
Christian Democracy, Constitutional Structure, and the Welfare State”,
American Journal of Sociology, 99(3): 711-749
[30] Im, K.S., M.H. Pesaran and Y. Shin (2003) “Testing for Unit Roots in
Heterogeneous Panels”, Journal of Econometrics, 115(1): 53-74
[31] Iversen, T. (2005) Capitalism, Democracy, and Welfare, Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press
[32] Kiviet, J.F. (1995) “On Bias, Inconsistency, and Efficiency of Various
Estimators in Dynamic Panel Models”, Journal of Econometrics, 68(1):
53-78
[33] Korpi, W. and J. Palme (2003) “New Politics and Class Politics in the
Context of Austerity and Globalization: Welfare State Regress in 18
Countries, 1975-95”, American Political Science Review, 97(3): 425-446
[34] Laver, M. and N. Schofield (1990) Multiparty Government: The Politics
of Coalition in Europe, Oxford: Oxford University Press
[35] Levin, A., C.-F. Lin and C.-S.J. Chu (2002) “Unit Root Tests in Panel
Data: Asymptotic and Finite-sample Properties”, Journal of Economet-
rics, 108(1): 1-24
[36] Lijphart, A. (1994) Electoral Systems and Party Systems: A Study
of Twenty-Seven Democracies, 1945-1990, Oxford: Oxford University
Press
35
[37] Lijphart, A. (1999) Patterns of Democracy, New Haven: Yale University
Press
[38] Lindbeck, A. and J.W. Weibull (1987) “Balanced-budget Redistribution
as the Outcome of Political Competition”, Public Choice, 52(3): 273-297
[39] Maddala, G.S. and S. Wu (1999) “A Comparative Study of Unit Root
Tests with Panel Data and a New Simple Test”, Oxford Bulletin of
Economics and Statistics, 61(0): 631-652
[40] Meltzer, A. and S. Richard (1981) “A Rational Theory of the Size of
Government”, Journal of Political Economy, 89(5): 914-927
[41] Milesi-Ferretti G.-M., R. Perotti and M. Rostagno (2002) “Electoral
Systems and the Composition of Public Spending”, Quarterly Journal
of Economics, 117(2): 609-657
[42] Mullahy, J. (1999) “Interaction Effects and Difference-in-Difference Es-
timation in Loglinear Models”, NBER Technical Working Paper 245
[43] Nickell, S. (1981) “Biases in Dynamic Models with Fixed Effects”,
Econometrica, 49(6): 1417-1426
[44] Pagano, M. and P. Volpin (2001) “The Political Economy of Finance”,
Oxford Review of Economic Policy, 17(4): 502-519
[45] Pagano, M. and P. Volpin (2005) “The Political Economy of Corporate
Governance”, American Economic Review, 95(4): 1005-1030
[46] Persson, T., G. Roland and G. Tabellini (2007) “Electoral Rules and
Government Spending in Parliamentary Democracies”, Quarterly Jour-
nal of Political Science, 2(2): 155-188
[47] Persson, T. and G. Tabellini (1999) “The Size and Scope of Government:
Comparative Politics with Rational Politicians”, European Economic
Review 43(4-6): 699-735
[48] Plu¨mper, T. and V.E. Troeger (2004) “Efficient Estimation of Rarely
Changing Variables in Fixed Effects Models”, SSRN Working Paper
Series
36
[49] Plu¨mper, T. and V.E. Troeger (2007) “Efficient Estimation of Time-
Invariant and Rarely Changing Variables in Finite Sample Panel Analy-
ses with Unit Fixed Effects”, Political Analysis, 15(2): 124-139
[50] Rae, D. (1967) The Political Consequences of Electoral Laws, New
Haven: Yale University Press
[51] Shepsle, K.A. and B.R. Weingast (1984) “Uncovered Sets and Sophis-
ticated Voting Outcomes with Implications for Agenda Institutions”,
American Journal of Political Science, 28(1): 49-74
[52] Scruggs, L. (2004) “Welfare State Entitlements Data Set: A Compara-
tive Institutional Analysis of Eighteen Welfare States”, Version 1.2
[53] Tabellini, G. (2000) “A Positive Theory of Social Security”, Scandina-
vian Journal of Economics, 102(3): 523-545
[54] Weingast, B.R., K.A. Shepsle and C. Johnsen (1981) “The Political
Economy of Benefits and Costs: A Neoclassical Approach to Distributive
Politics”, Journal of Political Economy, 89(4): 642-664
[55] Wooldridge, J.M. (2002) Econometric Analysis of Cross Section and
Panel Data, Cambridge, MA: MIT Press
37
A Demand for Redistribution
A.1 Basic Model of Welfare State Generosity
Table 1: Welfare state generosity (OLS)
[1] [2] [3] [4]
demand for redist. 0.067*** 0.434*** -0.277* -0.106
(0.020) (0.081) (0.157) (0.201)
party fract. 0.320*** 0.615*** -0.058 0.099
(0.032) (0.081) (0.128) (0.181)
dem. redist. x fract. -0.006*** 0.005** 0.003
(0.001) (0.002) (0.003)
unempl. rate -0.664*** -0.719***
(0.083) (0.082)
productivity (-1) -3.223* 1.372
(1.938) (3.082)
gov. partisanship -0.172*** -0.172***
(0.031) (0.034)
Estimator ols ols ols ols
Year dummies no no no yes
Country dummies no no no no
Number of Obs 276 276 245 245
R-Squared 0.174 0.181 0.391 0.418
Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 2: Marginal effect of the demand for redistribution (OLS)
party fract. [2] [3] [4]
min 0.158*** -0.005 0.034
(0.022) (0.043) (0.053)
mean less 1sd 0.088*** 0.062*** 0.068***
(0.018) (0.023) (0.025)
mean 0.042* 0.107*** 0.092***
(0.023) (0.024) (0.027)
mean plus 1sd -0.004 0.152*** 0.115**
(0.031) (0.037) (0.046)
max -0.045 0.194*** 0.137**
(0.039) (0.053) (0.068)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 3: Marginal effect of party fractionalization (OLS)
demand redist. [2] [3] [4]
min 0.452*** 0.101 0.181*
(0.048) (0.067) (0.098)
mean less 1sd 0.366*** 0.183*** 0.223***
(0.035) (0.045) (0.063)
mean 0.302*** 0.247*** 0.257***
(0.031) (0.044) (0.050)
mean plus 1sd 0.237*** 0.311*** 0.290***
(0.034) (0.057) (0.060)
max 0.164*** 0.385*** 0.328***
(0.044) (0.082) (0.090)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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A.2 Fixed Effects Model of Welfare State Generosity
Table 4: Welfare state generosity (FE)
[5] [6] [7] [8] [9]
demand for redist. -0.043 -0.231* -0.178 0.028*** 0.122***
(0.032) (0.118) (0.126) (0.007) (0.006)
party fract. 0.091** -0.077 -0.105 -0.105** -0.063
(0.043) (0.116) (0.109) (0.045) (0.040)
dem. redist. x fract. 0.003 0.002 0.002*** 0.001***
(0.002) (0.002) (0.000) (0.000)
unempl. rate -0.304*** -0.304*** -0.111*
(0.065) (0.066) (0.062)
productivity (-1) -5.024** -5.024** -1.047
(2.348) (2.388) (1.960)
gov. partisanship 0.003 0.003 0.001
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ρ 0.818
Estimator lsdv lsdv lsdv fevd fevd/ar1
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Obs 276 276 245 245 232
R-Squared 0.955 0.955 0.971 0.971 0.961
Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Estimator fevd, stage 1
and stage 3: AR1 Prais-Winsten transformation (serial correlation of the error
term). ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 5: Marginal effect of the demand for redistribution (FE)
party fract. [6] [7] [8] [9]
min -0.100** -0.053 0.153*** 0.186***
(0.040) (0.042) (0.018) (0.017)
mean less 1sd -0.067** -0.022 0.184*** 0.202***
(0.030) (0.027) (0.022) (0.021)
mean -0.045 -0.001 0.204*** 0.212***
(0.030) (0.023) (0.025) (0.024)
mean plus 1sd -0.023 0.019 0.225*** 0.223***
(0.038) (0.028) (0.029) (0.027)
max -0.004 0.038 0.244*** 0.233***
(0.047) (0.037) (0.031) (0.029)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 6: Marginal effect of party fractionalization (FE)
demand redist. [6] [7] [8] [9]
min -0.001 -0.032 -0.032 -0.026
(0.070) (0.063) (0.041) (0.037)
mean less 1sd 0.040 0.006 0.006 -0.007
(0.051) (0.044) (0.040) (0.036)
mean 0.071* 0.035 0.035 0.009
(0.043) (0.037) (0.039) (0.037)
mean plus 1sd 0.101** 0.065 0.065 0.024
(0.044) (0.040) (0.039) (0.037)
max 0.136** 0.098* 0.098** 0.041
(0.055) (0.055) (0.040) (0.039)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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B Dispersion of Preferences for Redistribu-
tion
B.1 Basic Model of Welfare State Generosity
Table 7: Welfare state generosity (OLS)
[10] [11] [12] [13]
disp. pref. redist. -0.095** 1.624*** 0.248 0.641
(0.046) (0.205) (0.484) (0.508)
party fract. 0.411*** 1.460*** 0.612** 1.056***
(0.040) (0.111) (0.276) (0.302)
disp. redist x fract. -0.023*** -0.006 -0.013*
(0.003) (0.006) (0.007)
unempl. rate -0.550*** -0.605***
(0.084) (0.082)
productivity (-1) -0.408 10.981***
(2.670) (3.427)
gov. partisanship -0.174*** -0.168***
(0.033) (0.033)
Estimator ols ols ols ols
Year dummies no no no yes
Country dummies no no no no
Number of Obs 276 276 245 245
R-Squared 0.170 0.201 0.386 0.441
Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 8: Marginal effect of the dispersion of preferences (OLS)
[11] [12] [13]
min 0.468*** -0.034 0.000
(0.080) (0.174) (0.177)
mean less 1sd 0.177*** -0.104 -0.158
(0.053) (0.104) (0.101)
mean -0.017 -0.151** -0.265***
(0.039) (0.067) (0.061)
mean plus 1sd -0.211*** -0.198*** -0.372***
(0.035) (0.061) (0.060)
max -0.380*** -0.242*** -0.470***
(0.041) (0.089) (0.095)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 9: Marginal effect of party fractionalization (OLS)
[11] [12] [13]
min 0.637*** 0.410*** 0.600***
(0.033) (0.059) (0.072)
mean less 1sd 0.484*** 0.373*** 0.515***
(0.030) (0.035) (0.043)
mean 0.347*** 0.340*** 0.439***
(0.035) (0.046) (0.047)
mean plus 1sd 0.211*** 0.306*** 0.363***
(0.044) (0.076) (0.076)
max -0.005 0.254* 0.244*
(0.064) (0.132) (0.134)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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B.2 Fixed Effects Model of Welfare State Generosity
Table 10: Welfare state generosity (FE)
[14] [15] [16] [17] [18]
disp. pref. redist. 0.086** 0.107 -0.006 0.052*** -0.161***
(0.043) (0.239) (0.230) (0.010) (0.010)
party fract. 0.100** 0.115 -0.090 -0.090* -0.307***
(0.045) (0.194) (0.181) (0.051) (0.049)
disp. redist. x fract. -0.000 0.003 0.003*** 0.006***
(0.003) (0.003) (0.001) (0.001)
unempl. rate -0.354*** -0.354*** -0.129**
(0.068) (0.070) (0.065)
productivity (-1) -6.194** -6.194** -0.923
(2.578) (2.591) (2.267)
gov. partisanship 0.004 0.004 0.000
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
ρ 0.802
Estimator lsdv lsdv lsdv fevd fevd/ar1
Year dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Country dummies yes yes yes yes yes
Number of Obs 276 276 245 245 232
R-Squared 0.955 0.955 0.972 0.972 0.964
Note: Panel corrected standard errors in parentheses. Estimator fevd, stage 1
and stage 3: AR1 Prais-Winsten transformation (serial correlation of the error
term). ∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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Table 11: Marginal effect of the dispersion of preferences (FE)
[15] [16] [17] [18]
min 0.093 0.135** 0.193*** 0.150***
(0.081) (0.066) (0.032) (0.031)
mean less 1sd 0.089* 0.170*** 0.228*** 0.227***
(0.050) (0.039) (0.040) (0.039)
mean 0.087** 0.194*** 0.251*** 0.279***
(0.041) (0.039) (0.045) (0.044)
mean plus 1sd 0.084* 0.217*** 0.275*** 0.331***
(0.051) (0.057) (0.051) (0.050)
max 0.082 0.239*** 0.297*** 0.378***
(0.068) (0.079) (0.056) (0.055)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
Table 12: Marginal effect of party fractionalization (FE)
[15] [16] [17] [18]
min 0.104 0.011 0.011 -0.086**
(0.082) (0.067) (0.041) (0.039)
mean less 1sd 0.102 0.029 0.029 -0.045
(0.064) (0.050) (0.041) (0.038)
mean 0.101** 0.046 0.046 -0.008
(0.051) (0.040) (0.041) (0.038)
mean plus 1sd 0.099** 0.063 0.063 0.028
(0.043) (0.039) (0.041) (0.038)
max 0.096** 0.089 0.089** 0.087**
(0.047) (0.055) (0.043) (0.039)
Note: Standard errors in parentheses.
∗p < 0.10, ∗∗p < 0.05, ∗∗∗p < 0.01
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C Descriptive Statistics
Table 13: Summary statistics of the sample
Variable Mean SDbw SDwth b/w Min Max N n T
WS generosity 26.61 7.80 1.70 4.60 17.42 45.38 276 12 23
demand for redist. 56.82 11.73 3.40 3.46 29.47 81.76 276 12 23
disp. pref. redist. 48.22 5.82 2.00 2.90 35.66 63.48 276 12 23
party fract. 71.12 7.78 3.87 2.01 50.10 86.85 276 12 23
unempl. rate 7.04 2.73 2.01 1.35 1.60 16.80 276 12 23
gov. partisanship 55.34 11.84 12.66 0.93 18.20 93.29 257 12 >21
productivity (log) 10.89 0.10 0.13 0.77 10.46 11.24 276 12 23
productivity 54079 5254 6786 0.77 34903 76325 276 12 23
Note: Our sample only includes 12 countries over 18. Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Nether-
lands, Portugal and Spain are excluded from the sample, due to the lack of data availability.
The first 5 countries lack data on preferences for redistribution (see Table 14 below); Spain
lacks data on welfare state generosity.
Table 14: ISSP surveys - sample size
Waves 1985 1987 1990 1992 1996 1999
Australia 1453 1563 2358 2091 2099 1602
Austria 966 934 988 972
Canada 964 1136 942
France 1276 1848
Germany 1032 1282 3770 3181 3224 1321
Ireland 1764 977 789
Italy 1580 1014 972 991 1065
Japan 1159 1195
Netherlands 1559
Norway 1475 1472 1302 1226
Portugal 1129
Spain 2387 1177
Sweden 714 1182 1110
United Kingdom 1513 1171 1186 1025 945 758
USA 665 1484 1201 1216 1264 1177
N 7209 9007 12726 12642 18016 15246
Note: Belgium and Finland did not participate to any of the above
waves. Data for Denmark are available only for the last wave
on a non standardized separate data set. We did not use it for
this study. Nor did we use data for Netherlands and Portugal,
since they were only available for the last wave (1999) and are by
construction time-invariant.
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Table 15: Unit Root Tests
Fisher Test IPS Test
Model χ2 p-value W[t-bar] p-value
yit AR(1) 33.262 0.405 -0.118 0.453
AR(1) + trend 45.969 0.052 -2.813 0.002
AR(1) + drift 88.104 0.000
fit AR(1) 25.269 0.909 -1.554 0.060
AR(1) + trend 41.363 0.248 -0.338 0.368
AR(1) + drift 91.802 0.000
uit AR(1) 100.009 0.000 -3.230 0.001
AR(1) + trend 110.680 0.000 -3.203 0.001
AR(1) + drift 169.700 0.000
wit AR(1) 17.076 0.996 1.070 0.858
AR(1) + trend 36.636 0.439 0.238 0.594
AR(1) + drift 63.290 0.003
git AR(1) 67.495 0.001 -2.225 0.013
AR(1) + trend 62.414 0.004 -1.651 0.049
AR(1) + drift 132.420 0.000
Note: H0: Non-stationary series. Fisher test from Maddala and
Wu (1999); IPS test from Im, Pesaran and Shin (2003).
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Figure 1: Welfare state generosity by country
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Figure 2: Demand for redistribution by country
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Figure 3: Dispersion of preferences for redistribution by country
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Figure 4: Distribution of preferences for redistribution - 1985
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Figure 5: Distribution of preferences for redistribution - 1987
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Figure 6: Distribution of preferences for redistribution - 1990
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Figure 7: Distribution of preferences for redistribution - 1992
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Figure 8: Distribution of preferences for redistribution - 1996
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Figure 9: Distribution of preferences for redistribution - 1999
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Figure 10: Party fractionalization by country
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Figure 11: WS generosity and party fractionalization (corr 0.50)
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Figure 12: WS generosity and demand for redistribution (corr 0.34)
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Figure 13: WS generosity and dispersion of preferences (corr 0.14)
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